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COLLAPSE, PLURALS AND SETS
EDUARDO ALEJANDRO BARRIO
Abstract. This paper raises the question under what circumstances a plurality forms a set.
My main point is that not always all things form sets. A provocative way of presenting my
position is that, as a result of my approach, there are more pluralities than sets. Another
way of presenting the same thesis claims that there are ways of talking about objects that
do not always collapse into sets. My argument is related to expressive powers of formal
languages. Assuming classical logic, I show that if all plurality form a set and the quantifiers
are absolutely general, then one gets a trivial theory. So, by reductio, one has to abandon
one of the premiss. Then, I argue against the collapse of the pluralities into sets. What I
am advocating is that the thesis of collapse limits important applications of the plural logic in
model theory, when it is assumed that the quantifiers are absolutely general.
Keywords: Pluralities; absolute generality; sets; hierarchies.
We often say that some things form a set. For instance, every house in Beacon Hill
may form a set. Also, all antimatter particles in the universe, all even numbers, all
odd numbers, and in general all natural numbers do so. Naturally, following this line
of thought, one might think that the plurality of all things constitutes a set. And al-
though natural language allows us, by means of its plural constructions, to talk about
objects without grouping them in one entity, there are also nominalization devices
to turn constructions involving high order expressive resources into others that only
make use of first order ones. For example, the predicate “to be a natural number”
can be transformed into “the property of being a natural number”, and the plural ex-
pression “the antimatter particles” into “the collection of antimatter particles”. Such
transformations motivate some version of the Collapse Thesis. If one follows this line
—as with the Beacon Hill houses and the numbers— every time we have some things,
there will be a set constituted by them. Despite the initial plausibility of the thesis,
in this article I will defend a completely different stance. According to my point of
view, not all things always form sets. One provocative way of presenting my position
would be to say that, as a result of this, there are more pluralities than sets. Another
perhaps less attractive way to put it is to say that there are devices to talk about ob-
jects that do not always collapse into sets. My argument is related to the expressive
needs of formal languages. I defend that the collapse thesis imposes limitations on
important applications of logic to model theory, when one assumes that quantifiers
are absolutely general.
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1. Pluralities and formal theories
Natural languages contain singular terms, quantifiers and predicates (e.g. ‘it’, ‘some-
thing’ and “. . . is in Boston’). But it also contains plural terms, quantifiers and pred-
icates (e.g. ‘they’, ‘some things’ and ‘. . . are scattered on the floor’). Philosophers,
logicians and linguists (Yi 1999, 2005; Oliver and Smiley 2001; Rayo 2003; and
McKay 2006) have become increasingly interested in plurals over the past couple of
decades. A plural predicate is a predicate taking a plural variable in one or more of
its argument places. According to Pluralism, ‘   (x x)’ can be jointly satisfied or un-
satisfied by several individuals at once. Plural expressions such as ‘some things’ are
a primary concern in plural logic. In classical singular first order logic, we only have
singular variables like x and y , which are bounded by singular universal (‘  x ’) and
existential (‘   x ’) quantifiers. Besides these expressive devices, in plural logic we have
plural variables, like x x and y y , which can be bounded by plural quantifiers. In plu-
ral languages, the universal plural quantifier   x x is interpreted (intuitively) as ‘any
objects such that’ and the existential plural quantifier   x x as ‘there are some things
such that’. (Boolos 1984 and 1985.) Then according to Pluralism, all that is required
for the truth of ‘   x x   (x x)’ is that there be individuals in the range of one’s singular
quantifiers that jointly satisfy ‘   (x x)’. As a result, pluralists believe that the use of
plural quantifiers carries no commitment to entities outside the range of one’s singu-
lar quantifiers. In this way, the plural quantification is understood as a new form of
quantification over the same old thing (those in the first-order domain).
There are several reasons for motivating the adoption of plural resources. For
example, the Geach-Kaplan sentence (see Boolos 1984) ‘Some critics admire only
one another’ does not allow for a first-order rendering on the intended interpretation.
The second-order formalization is:
  X [   z(Xz   Cz)     xX x     x , y((X x   Ax y)   (x  = y   X y))]
Of course, it can be formalized in first-order set theory as well, but the original
sentence does not seem to commit to sets in any way. In formal presentations of
plural logic, a plural logical predicate   is also included. The expression “u   x x” is
interpreted (intuitively) as “u is one of the x x”. Then, adopting plural quantification,
this sentence can be formalized as:
  x x [   u(u   x x   Cu) &   u   v(u   x x & Auv   v   x x & u  = v)]
without any commitment to sets.
One important question is about the formal principles that involve pluralities.
Plural quantifiers obey rules analogous to the classical introduction and elimination
rules. For example, in the case of the existential plural quantifier, the introduction
and elimination rules are as follows:
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Existential Introduction
  (x x)     x x(   (x x))
Existential Elimination
   
————— =   ———————
  (x x)       x x(   (x x))    
(where ‘x x ’ does not occur free in   or   ). These rules are completely analogous to
the rules governing the singular quantifiers. So. it can hardly be denied that they too
qualify as logical.
Nevertheless, as well as set theory for sets, one has to add some particular ax-
ioms about pluralities. In this way, plural formal theories include the plural naïve
comprehension schema:
COMP-P:   u  u     x x   u(u   x x     (u))
where   is a formula in the that contains ‘u’ and possibly other variables free but
contains no occurrence of ‘x x ’. Which intuitively this axiom says that, for any condi-
tion   (u), assuming there is at least one   , some things are such that something is
one of them just in case it satisfies that condition. Further, in order fully to capture
the idea that all pluralities are non-empty, one also adopts the axiom:
  x x   u(u   x x)
Finally, the following axiom schema of extensionality:
  x x   y y [   u(u   x x   u   y y)   (   (x x)     ( y y))]
ensures that all coextensive pluralities are indiscernible.
Proponents of plural quantification claim that these theories allow plural locu-
tions to be formalized in a way that is fundamentally different from the old set-
theoretic paraphrases. In particular, plural theory is not ontologically committed to
any entities beyond those already accepted in the ordinary first order domain. It has
also the property of being universally applicable: the theory of plural quantification
can be applied to any realm of discourse, no matter what objects this discourse is
concerned with. This distinguishes the plural theories both from set theory and from
second-order logic with the usual set theory semantics. Moreover, the theory of plu-
ral quantification presupposes no extra-logical ideas to be understood. Plurals can be
understood directly. Our understanding of it does not consist in an understanding of
extra-logical ideas, such as ideas from set theory or other mathematical theories.
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In sum, singular and plural quantifiers have introduction and elimination rules
that are completely analogous. Plural systems, as well as the first-order logic, are
ontologically innocent, universally applicable and cognitively neutral. However, some
people challenge the status of COMP-P as a truth of plural logic for different reasons,
claiming it should not be included in the system, because this principle implies a
contradiction. The most promising proposal adopts some form of collapse: the thesis
that for any plurality of objects, there is a set constituted by those objects. The idea
is that there is a collapse from pluralities into sets. “Pluralities and sets fit naturally
together”. (Linnebo 2010, p.151.) That is, the advocate of Collapse maintains
COLLAPSE:   x x   yFORM(x x , y)
where the plural predicate “Form(x x , y)” is an abbreviated way to say that the things
x x form a set if and only if   u(u   x x   u   y). Recall that Collapse is compatible
with the possibility of pluralities and sets not being identical. The thesis says that for
any objects, there is a set constituted by them.
In the next part, I will present the knock-down argument. This argument can be
used to reject COMP-P using COLLAPSE. This argument comes from a semantic ver-
sion of Russell’s paradox. I am going to show that COMP-P and COLLAPSE jointly
entail triviality. Then, I will offer some reasons to reject COLLAPSE in order to allow
to support COMP-P.
2. The knock-down argument
Lets suppose that a plural theory (a formal classical logical system) includes the plural
naive comprehension schema, and that we adopt an absolutely unrestricted reading
of the existential plural quantifier in it.1 Then, for each condition   (u), there are
some things that are all and only the things satisfying the condition. An instance of
this schema allows us to consider the objects rr which are all and only the sets that
aren’t members of themselves:
1.   u(u   r r   u    u)
But, by collapse, the rr form the Russell set:
2.   r   u(u   r   u   r r)
From 1 and 2, the following characterization of the Russell set r is obtained:
3.   u(u   r   u    u)
And by universal quantifier elimination in 3, with respect to r, we get:
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4. r   r   r    r
If classical logic is accepted, 4 entails a contradiction.
Nonetheless, it is not clear what should we conclude from that argument. Every-
body agrees that it is a reductio. But there is no consensus regarding the object of
such reductio. There are several options.
In the first place, as I said above, the argument implicitly assumes an unrestricted
interpretation of the quantifiers. If we didn’t, it would be possible to say that their
scope has changed in the course of the argument. In particular, one could say that
the quantifier   r in 2 has a bigger domain than the quantifier   in 1.2 If that were
the case, the step from 3 to 4 would not be valid, since it involves an instantiation
of the quantifier regarding an object which cannot be assumed to be on its domain.
Of course, this means that one way to block the argument is to reject that there
is such thing as genuine unrestricted quantification. This line of thought has got
important defendants. For example, it could be argued that there are grounds for
questioning the very intelligibility of unrestricted quantification. This line of attack
could be based on traditional arguments for semantic indeterminacy arising from the
Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. In particular, it is well known that first-order logic can-
not distinguish unrestricted quantification from restricted quantification. This means
that no theory can discriminate between interpretations with an all-inclusive domain
and interpretations with a restricted domain. Anything unrestricted quantification
supported may say, if true by his lights, can be so interpreted as to hold true of a
restricted domain. Nonetheless, it is clear that this indeterminacy only affects to first
order languages. As it is well known, the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem canA˛ft be gen-
eralized to higher-order languages. So, this objection is very limited. Other influential
strategy for casting doubt on the unrestricted quantification derives from the work of
Michael Dummett. He claims that “indefinitely extensible concept is one such that,
if we can form a definite conception of a totality all of whose members fall under
the concept, we can, by reference to that totality, characterize a larger totality all
of whose members fall under it” (Dummett 1993, p.441). Picking up on this idea,
Parsons (1974) and Glanzberg (2004) (2006) state that the possibility of indefinitely
extending quantification domains implies the unfeasibility of unrestricted quantifica-
tion over their instances. The picture arising in its place is that of an open series of
domains, each of them extending beyond its predecessor, but none of which is capable
of comprising everything. An especially pressing problem for this approach concerns
the proper formulation of their view (Williamson 2006; Fine 2006). A proper expres-
sion of generality of this approach cannot presuppose that unrestricted quantification
is possible. So the warm-up formulation, i.e.
It is not possible to quantify over absolutely everything,
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will be self-defeating if ‘everything’ ranges, in effect, over absolutely everything. As
Lewis affirms: “Maybe [who rejects the genuine unrestricted quantification] replies
that some mystical censor stops us from quantifying over absolutely everything with-
out restriction. (. . .) He violates his own stricture in the very act of proclaiming it.”
(Lewis 1990, p.68.) The same strategy is following by McGee. He says: “The rea-
son [ the skepticism about the genuine unrestricted quantification] is not a serious
worry is that the thesis that, for any discussion, there are things that lie outside the
universe of discourse of that discussion is a position that cannot be coherently main-
tained. Consider the discussion we are having right now. We cannot coherently claim
that there are things that lie outside the universe of our discussion, for any witness
to the truth of that claim would have to lie outside the claim’s universe of discourse.”
(McGee 2000, p.55.) So, unrestricted quantification seems not only possible but nec-
essary. Other examples as:
Everything is self-identical.
seems to show that unrestricted quantification is also necessary for expressing thesis
about absolutely everything.
In the second place, the argument use COMP-P and COLLAPSE. But, of course, it
also uses classical logic to get triviality. Then, an option could involve the rejection of
some classical principles. At least three projects stand out as deserving of recognition:
the paraconsistent approach of Priest and others, (Priest 1979) the paracomplete ap-
proach of Field and others (Field 2008) and views for which the transitivity of impli-
cation fails (Weir 1998; 2005). I am not to going to consider these options for reasons
of brevity. But it is clear that there may be good reasons for avoid this route because a
substantial weakening of classical logic will be required: typically paraconsistent log-
ics lack modus ponens, paracomplete logics lack identity and systems of logic without
transitivity have problems to analyze validity as truth-preservation. So, there are two
opposite ways to answer the paradox: one of them consists in abandoning COMP-P
and defend COLLAPSE; the other one follows the contrary route.
TRIVIALITY
       
COLLAPSE:   x x   yFORM (x x , y) COMP-P:   u   (u)     x x   u(u   x x     (u))
       
Unrestricted quantifiers Classical logic
My own answer to the argument follows this last path. My position states that,
because of reasons connected with the expressibility of languages, we have enough
motives to adopt COMP-P. Henceforth, if we want to restore consistency and accept
unrestricted quantification, we must abandon COLLAPSE.
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3. Implausibility of real collapse between plural forms and sets
According to my position, the strategy of adopting COLLAPSE and restricting COMP-
P suffers many difficulties. On the first place, the adoption of Collapse is implausible
because it does not allow set theoretical models with absolute generality of quantifi-
cation. Basically this thesis turns unrestricted quantification over sets unstable. Let’s
recall a renowned argument one must answer in defending COLLAPSE. Assume one
of the philosophical interests of model theory is to give formal languages a gener-
alized semantics. That is, a theory about all the ways to interpret linguistic devices.
One motivation related to this interest could be the following: given any language,
the definition of logical consequence presupposes the possibility to quantify over ev-
ery way of interpreting the non logical expressions. If model theory weren’t capable
of representing absolutely every one of these interpretations, the aforementioned def-
inition would not be extensionally adequate. We can add to this the thesis that one
of those interpretations is maximally expressive, the so called “absolute generality”
thesis (Rayo & Uzquiano 2006). According to it, there are uses of quantification by
means of which we can talk about absolutely every object. There are two aspects of
this. On one hand, the commitment with the existence of languages furnished with
enough expressive resources to be able to quantify in a completely unrestricted way.
On the other hand, the endorsement of an absolutely general domain over which
the variables are linked to the quantifiers to get their values. In sum, we support the
approach that accepts languages with maximally expressive resources.
Consider a first order language intended to deal with all sets. Formulate that lan-
guage in the theory ZF. Clearly, if one adopts the thesis according to which every pos-
sible interpretation is captured by some set theoretic model, then doing generalized
semantics for the language of ZF is just doing applied set theory. But the absolutely
general interpretation of a first order language requires a domain that collects ev-
erything there is. Nevertheless, if interpretations are sets —and because according
to the theorems of ZF there is no universal set— there is no model that captures
the absolutely general interpretation of that language (Barrio 2007, 2009, and Rayo
2003).
Another way of making the same point is to appeal to the iterative conception of
the universe of sets (Linnebo 2013). The iterative conception gives us a consistent
characterization of the set theoretic universe as a cumulative hierarchy. According to
this approach, sets build up a hierarchy. In the inferior level are the urelements, or, in
the absence of them, the empty set. New sets appear as we go up the hierarchy, each
of them belonging to a determinate level. There are two kinds of levels: successors
and limit. In each successor stage we get every set formed by objects in the previous
stages. In the limit stage we get the union of all sets below that stage. The hierarchy
extends as long as possible. That is, at least prima facie, there is no upper bound,
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or a maximum stage. Every time we fix a determinate limit, it seems possible to
go beyond it. In contrast with the ongoing hierarchy of the iterative approach, an
absolutely general interpretation of ZF axioms and theorems requires the ability to
talk about every set. Put in another way, the scope of the quantifiers in ZF formulae
such as “the empty sets has no members whatsoever” or “there is no set of all sets”
seems to ask for a definite totality that ZF claims it doesn’t exist.
The COLLAPSE defendant finds herself in serious trouble when she aims to ex-
press unrestricted quantification among sets. Such thesis seemingly leads to the idea
of capturing interpretations in the universe of sets. Hence, domains of quantification
must be sets. But since the universe of sets is iterative, when we talk about a universal
domain we cannot be referring to a set that can be found in the hierarchy. Because
of that, if it is to be assumed that interpretations are captured by sets, the idea of a
universal set would lead to contradiction. Therefore, every quantification presuppos-
ing domains to be set-like entities cannot be absolutely general. And so it would not
be possible for a COLLAPSE defendant to do generalized semantics.
Notice that an appeal to the Kreisel squeezing argument (see Kreisel 1967) would
not be of much help for the COLLAPSE defendant. According to the theorem, in
the case of first order logical theories, it is enough (in the sense of an extensionally
adequate definition of logical consequence) to consider set theoretic interpretations.
Nonetheless, the proof of the theorem relies on the completeness of the theory. That
is why the theorem cannot be applied to a theory which complies with the conditions
of Gödel’s Theorems. In particular, it does not apply to higher order languages. For
these cases, there is the possibility of an extensional divergence arising between set
theoretic and non set theoretic ways of interpreting the expressions.
Summing up, if we want to do generalized semantics and allow absolutely unre-
stricted interpretation of the quantifier, we must reject the thesis that interpretations
are captured by set theoretic models. By requiring that the domains of quantification
be set-sized, COLLAPSE rules out any interpretation whose domain is too big to form
a set. As a result, COLLAPSE is unable to capture all the intuitive interpretations of
the language, such as those in which the domain of quantification contains absolutely
everything. This is especially problematic if, as in the case of plural logic with stan-
dard semantics, the completeness theorem fails, and thus there is no assurance via
Kreisel’s squeezing argument that the mere appeal to interpretations with a set-sized
domain yields an extensionally adequate relation of logical consequence. That’s why
COLLAPSE turns unrestricted quantification unstable.
On the contrary, if COLLAPSE is not adopted, there is a promising answer to this
argument. Ever since the work of Boolos,3 appealing to pluralities is a usual way
to resolve the tension between the apparent continuous expansion of the hierarchy
underlying the iterative conception and the semantic requirements needed to make
unrestricted interpretations of the quantifiers possible: we can talk about all the sets
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without presupposing that such totality forms a set.4 In this way, a model is not seen
as a set, but as a plurality of objects. There are indeed many different manners in
which this idea can be implemented. Without giving much technical details, we can
say that the language in which the interpretations of ZF formulae are given must
include expressive resources enough to quantify over pluralities and express plural
predicates. It is important to point out that relying on these expressive resources
does not suppose any kind of ontological rise. We can refer to the domain of ZF by
talking about “the sets” without committing to any new entities. A plurality of objects
is formed just by the objects that constitute it.
Of course, if we were to collapse pluralities into sets, that kind of option would
not be available. We wouldn’t be able to talk about a domain of certain objects, simply
by talking about the objects themselves. Denying COLLAPSE, we can talk about the
universal domain simply by talking about some things such that everything is one of
them. That is:
  x x   u(u   x x)
where the plural existential quantifier and the singular universal quantifier are inter-
preted in an absolutely unrestricted way. It is evident that this move requires rejecting
the All-in-One Principle.5 According to this principle, in order to quantify over certain
objects, one must presuppose those objects constitute a complete collection: a thing
that has said objects as members.
All-in-One: To quantify over some objects presupposes that those objects constitute
a set or set-like collection that has those objects as its elements.
The adoption of the COLLAPSE thesis, along with this principle, limits the possibility
of quantifying over all sets without forming a new set. The plausibility of the All-in-
One principle is linked with the need to fix the quantifier scope in a precise manner.
To quantify over absolutely all objects whatsoever requires — per impossible — that
there be a set- or set-like domain that has absolutely everything as an element. The
needs — at least, the ontological needs — of absolutely general quantification are
met simply by there being some things that severally comprise absolutely everything.
But, as well known, according to set theory, this is not possible: this entity cannot
exist. Nonetheless, the development of Boolos semantics shows we can fix the scope
of the quantifiers, even in an absolutely general interpretation, without collecting all
those objects into a new entity. Rejection of COLLAPSE opens the possibility of talking
about some things that satisfy a condition without them forming a thing. One way
of making this point is to call attention to the fact that giving up COLLAPSE allows
us to replace the all-in-one principle for some sort of plural quantification principle,
known as All-in-Many (Uzquiano2009):
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All-in-Many: In order to quantify over objects which satisfy some condition, one
must presuppose there are some things which are all and only the things
satisfying the condition.
That is, the existence of some predicative way of fixing the quantification domain
that is not an object. If it were, it would fall under the unrestricted quantification,
restoring the aforementioned problems.6
In sum, adopting All-in-Many principle and rejecting COLLAPSE one may char-
acterize a plural unrestricted reading of the quantifiers as the claim that quantifiers
sometimes range over some things that comprise absolutely everything. If one accepts
COLLAPSE, then this strategy is not available.
On the second place, when facing the knock-down argument, the COLLAPSE de-
fendant needs to restrict the scope of COMP-P to restore consistency, if she is willing to
accept an unrestricted reading of the quantifiers. Nevertheless, I think there isn’t any
candidate that is at the same time non arbitrary, plausible, and does not restrict the
scope of absolute generality. That is, given the reductio pushed by the knock-down
argument, the COLLAPSE defendant must abandon COMP-P if she wants to avoid
contradiction. But, for the answer to be complete, she must offer an explanation of
why COMP-P fails.
A path available for the COLLAPSE defendant would be to dig deeper into the
extensional nature of sets and pluralities. In this direction, Linnebo (2010) argues
that, given the common extensional nature, both sets and pluralities fit together.
COLLAPSE would be a natural consequence, streaming from the fact that plural logic
guarantees every plurality is always absolutely determined by its extension. Because
of that, there seems to be no reason to deny that:
  u(u   y   u   x x)
That is, at least part of the nature of sets and pluralities is constituted by the
elements belonging to those entities. In Uzquiano’s words:
What motivates the move is the intuitive thought that all it takes for some
objects to form a set is for them to exist. Once the members have been char-
acterized, their set has been specified. A set is, after all, completely charac-
terized by its elements. Once we have them, there is nothing to bar them
to form a set. No further fact is required. So COLLAPSE has great initial ap-
peal, and onemay prefer to sacrifice plural comprehension in order to restore
consistency. In particular, if we allow some sets to be all and only the non-
self-membered sets, then nothing else stands in the way of their set, which,
we know, will yield a contradiction (Uzquiano 2009, p.307).
And so, given that the nature of sets and pluralities is intimately related to their
members, if COLLAPSE were true, the restriction of COMP-P could be motivated on
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the set theoretic hierarchy. That is, a condition successfully generates some objects
only when applied to members of some set in the cumulative hierarchy. In this sense,
and in the same fashion as sets, COMP-P could be replaced by the following axiom
of plural separation (Uzquiano 2009):
SEP-P:   t   x x   u(u   x x   (u   t     (u)))
If t is a set and   a condition, then there are some objects which are all and
only the members of t satisfying   . This principle allows us to separate objects from
a set by means of a certain condition they satisfy. However, as Uzquiano notices,
the adoption of SEP-P gives a direct route from the Russellian argument to the non
existence of a comprehensive domain. By SEP-P one can get:
  x x   u(u   x x   (u = u))
And by COLLAPSE, those objects form a set. But by SEP-P, some of those objects
are the non self-membered sets. And since:
  x x   u(u   x x   (u    u))
a contradiction follows. Besides, a serious problem with this strategy is that an expla-
nation of which instances of COMP-P are safe and which aren’t is conceptually prior
to an explanation of what sets there are.
Another alternative, also considered by Uzquiano (2009), consists in accepting
only predicative instances of COMP-P. This way out, inspired by Dummett’s diagnosis
of the Russell paradox, (Dummett 1991) has nonetheless serious problems.
The main one is, as Burguess notes, that the impredicative restriction of the plural
comprehension schema restrains us from obtaining enough mathematics. By adopt-
ing Frege’s Law V,
  F   G(ex t(F ) = ex t(G)     x(F x   Gx))
Along with non predicative second order logic, we cannot go beyond Robinson arith-
metic. In particular, any systemwhich adopts any form of induction needs to liberalize
the predicative conditions.
In short, it is not easy to see how the COLLAPSE defendant could justify impos-
ing restrictions to COMP-P. The natural appeal to the set theoretic hierarchy doesn’t
seem to help, since neither of the apparent open paths leads to a non arbitrary and
sufficiently expressive answer.
Moreover, even if pluralities and sets did satisfy their respective extensionality
axiom, I don’t favor the idea that such fact authorizes the collapse. According to my
position, matters of abstract entities existence are internal to their suitable axiomati-
zations. What sets are there? It is a question that is answered by analyzing ZF axioms
and the model theoretic structures that satisfy them. What pluralities are there? It
Principia 18(3): 419–438 (2014).
430 Eduardo Alejandro Barrio
is a question that is answered by analyzing axioms of plural logic and their models.
Clearly, there are some entities that make those axioms true. Nevertheless, there is
no empty plurality, or single-element plurality, even though there is an empty set and
its singleton. On top of that, unlike sets, pluralities satisfy the axiom of naïve plural
comprehension:
  x x   u(u   x x     (u))
without incurring in Russellian inconsistencies. It is enough to avoid contradiction
that we don’t collapse pluralities into sets, and that we keep two alternative quanti-
fying domains. Nonetheless, sets cannot satisfy the naïve comprehension axiom:
  x   u(u   x     (u))
And, according to ZF, they satisfy other axioms that despite guaranteeing the exis-
tence of certain sets, are not as liberal as to allow that every condition determines a
set.
Notice that my position against COLLAPSE does not hang on any supposition
about the size of pluralities and sets. That is, I am not committed with rejecting the
collapse because pluralities are too big to form a set. This line of thought could be
inspired by certain analysis of the Russell paradox: in order to avoid a contradiction,
we should limit the size of sets. We do not have to do such thing with pluralities. Be-
cause of that, there is certain direction someone who rejects COLLAPSE might take:
some pluralities are too big compared to sets. Nevertheless, I concur with Linnebo in
that there is no acceptable concept of limitation of size. Any appeal to a particular
cardinality to limit sizes will always be arbitrary. The iterative universe of sets grows
without limits and, in principle, I do not see any reason, besides ZF axioms, to restrict
the existence of sets, no matter what their size is.7 My point is that pluralities do not
collapse into sets because the axioms that regulate them are different from those
regulating sets. In particular, pluralities satisfy COMP-P without generating contra-
diction. Such a thing cannot happen with sets. If every condition were to determine
a set, we would have a direct path to Russell’s paradox.
One way of reinforcing these reasons against COLLAPSE appeals to the standard
semantics for high order languages. Usually, Peano arithmetic is formulated in a first
order language PA1. Because of that, the principle of mathematical induction is for-
malized through the following schema:
(   (0)     x(   (x)     (Sx)))     x(   (x))
Where   (x) can be replaced by any open formula in the language of arithmetic,
with x free. We would like   (x) to be instantiated by genuine arithmetical condi-
tions. Nonetheless, different arithmetical axiomatizations can be obtained, depend-
ing on how liberal we are with respect to which instances are genuine. Of course,
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formally we must replace the induction schema with a formula involving high order
quantification. But what the range of these quantifiers may be depends on the un-
derlying expressive resources. Usually, some kind of COMP axiom is used in order to
determine legitimate instances. Being more or less liberal about the instances yields
different subsystems of
second order arithmetic PA2. However, if the COMP axiom is restricted, it is not
possible to avoid non standard models, as a direct result of the compactness theo-
rem. It is well known that Dedekind showed that all models of PA2 are isomorphic
(to the standard model).8 Of course, it is crucial to obtain this result that assign-
ments to second order variables take values from the full collection of subsets of the
domain. In this case, non standard models are avoided.9 Because of that, it is only
by means of standard semantics for high order languages that we can get categorical
PA. That is, only if unrestricted COMP-P is adopted, we have categoricity of models
of arithmetic.10
Finally it is important to note that I am not affirming that never some things form
a set. Some things form a set and some other things do not. For example, the empty
set and its singleton form a set. The sets do not. But we need to talk about sets in
order to get enough expressive power to get the intended model of the set theory. Of
course, one important question is under what conditions a plurality forms a set. It is
clear to me that this problem depends on our conception about sets. For example, if
one adopt the iterative conception about sets, one can support the claim:
ITER-SET: Some x x form a set iff there is some á such that the x x all occur at some
point in the hierarchy of sets.
Nevertheless, ITER-SET could be considered too restricted. Non-well-founded
sets are described consistently by Aczel. In this description, he modifies ZF by re-
moving Foundation, and adding some (Aczel 1988) anti-foundation axiom securing
the existence of non-well-founded sets. Then, maybe some xx could form an Aczel’s
set. But my point is that not always a plurality form a set. And my response to the
question about when a plurality do not form a set depends on the universe of sets
is. When does a given plurality form a set? When our best set theory confirms that it
does. When does not? When for reasons expressive our plurals constructions allow
to talk consistently about objects without forming a set.
In conclusion, in this section I have defended the thesis that there are expres-
sive reasons that make collapse from plural resources to singular ones undesirable.
Firstly the adoption of Collapse is implausible because it does not allow set theoretical
models with absolute generality of quantification. Secondly when facing the knock-
down argument, the COLLAPSE defendant needs to restrict the scope of COMP-P to
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restore consistency, if she is willing to accept an unrestricted reading of the quan-
tifiers. Nevertheless, I think there isn’t any candidate that is at the same time non
arbitrary, plausible, and does not restrict the scope of absolute generality. Thirdly, as
I noted, I am not supporting that never some things form a set. Some things form a
set and some other things do not. But, the problem is to adopt the thesis according
to which always some things form a set. In this case, plurals constructions lost the
most important: their capability to talk beyond objects that can form a set.
4. Implausibility of the possibilist version of Collapse
Recently, Linnebo (2010) has defended the thesis that sets and pluralities hierarchies
are potential (not really complete, but it is always possible to obtain new sets and
expand it).11 In this direction, he proposes to adopt a modal version of collapse and
COMP-P, which captures the potential character of the hierarchies. The idea is simple.
Linnebo starts with the set theoretic hierarchy. Possible stages in the process of set
formation are in this perspective thought of as possible worlds. The potential char-
acter of the hierarchy is made explicit by introducing two modal operators:   and
  . The idea is to treat both operators as primitive, their behavior being regulated
by some modal logic. Just for heuristic purposes, it is useful to interpret     as “it is
possible to go on to form sets so as to make it the case that   ”, and     as “no matter
what sets we go on to form it will remain the case that   .”
The key point of his proposal can be found in the models of the logic. Linnebo
suggests adopting a modal logic of the kind of S4.2, which is satisfied by structures
with a reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive, well-founded, directed and maximal ac-
cessibility relation between worlds (or stages of formation).12
Linnebo defends his point of view by saying his solutions provide an explanation
of why the axiom of plural comprehension has to be restricted when (in the context
of set theory) quantifiers are understood as having an implicit modal character. And
at the same time, it allows us to maintain a modal version of COLLAPSE. Accord-
ing to Linnebo “plural collapse has an elegant modal implementation, which can be
used to provide a novel motivation for ZF set theory.” In this modal implementation,
COLLAPSE states that:
    x x     yForm(x x , y)
That is, given any objects xx, it is possible to form a set which has exactly those
objects as elements. Themodal translation of the unrestricted comprehension schema
is:
P-COMP*:     x x     u(u   x x     (u))
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That is, given any condition   (u), it is possible that there are some objects such
that (no matter whether they form a set), they are all and only the objects satisfy-
ing the condition. According to Linnebo, in the knock-down context, if a non modal
reading of the quantifiers is assumed —as I do in this article— COLLAPSE is false.
However, it is possible to give another reading of the quantification, one that restores
consistency and prevents collapse from being knocked down. In this respect, he says:
For given some objects x x , the existence of a set with precisely x x as ele-
ments is only potential. This means that we may go on to form such as set.
But it does not mean that such a set has actually been formed, which is what
collapse asserts.
And then he goes on to say:
When the quantifiers are understood as having an implicit modal character,
Collapse is true and (COMPP) is false. And when the quantifiers are taken at
face value, Collapse is false and (COMP-P) is true (Linnebo 2010, p.13).
If Linnebo is right, and every plurality potentially defines a set, even if the argu-
ments I have given in the previous section are correct, they are not enough to prevent
every form of collapse. In some sense, although not every plurality collapses into a
set, there is no room for pluralities to lie outside the set theoretic hierarchy, for every
plurality may form a set.
Even though Linnebo’s picture seems attractive, I think it is not problem-free.
A general reaction about this strategy is that it is not clear how to understand the
modalities involved. Naturally — as Linnebo himself admits— modalities should not
be understood ontologically, for sets are abstract entities that, if existent, they exist in
every possible world. However, in Linnebo’s picture they seem to have a contingent
existence. In particular, given the inherent potentiality of the proposed hierarchy,
the system allows the existence of the elements of a set without the existence of the
set itself. Otherwise, it would not be possible for pluralities to not actually collapse.
This feature is characteristic of the system S4.2, adopted by Linnebo. The model
contrasts with the one presented by Fine (1981), who adopts the system S5 for a
similar purpose. In this case, necessarily if the elements of a set exist, the set exists
as well. Regarding this, I don’t see how, being purely extensional entities, sets could
fail to exist when all of their members are there. To emphasize this, it seems that to
model a potential hierarchy not only makes existence a contingent matter, but it also
requires an explanation of how can a set move from potentiality to actuality.
Moreover, it seems plausible to say that if we don’t have an absolute modality —
absolutely general quantification over worlds — we cannot quantify over absolutely
every set. But if some sort of indefinite extensibility over worlds is adopted, it does not
seem possible to quantify over absolutely every set. What I mean is that the potential
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picture in Linnebo’s modal system fits better with abandoning absolute generality
than with adopting it.
It is true that in a world we can make general statements about sets. But, applied
to a certain world, COLLAPSE is false. It is not true that every plurality in a world
forms a set in that world. And since there is modal collapse, the universe of sets
expands and goes on to form enough sets to collapse any plurality. But then, if at
some point of the process were it possible to quantify unrestrictedly over every set,
the process would be over.
A different way of making the same point is to note that the proposal prevents
applications of plural logic meant to express set theory models with an absolutely
general interpretation of the quantifiers. For the potential collapse of pluralities into
sets precludes them from expressing the whole universe of sets, if we want to avoid
contradiction.
One final thing I want to mention is that COMP-P
  u  (u)     x x   u(u   x x     (u))
is a truth of plural logic. However, it turns out not to be a necessary truth according
to the potentialist perspective, as is shown by this principle:
P-COMP*:     x x     u(u   x x     (u))
This seems very strange. Usually logical truths are necessary. Then, the defender
of P-COMP* should explain this puzzling result.
5. How to restore consistency by abandoning COLLAPSE
In this article I have argued against COLLAPSE. I have tried to show that adoption
of such a thesis leads to profound expressive limitations in languages: adopting un-
restricted quantification, it doesn’t seem possible to give semantics for set theory.
At the same time, restrictions to COMP-P — necessary to restore consistency — cru-
cially limit the expressive resources of high order languages, if COLLAPSE is not given
up. The possibility of expressing the categoricity result of PA2 mandates not to limit
COMP-P. On the other hand, the modal version of COLLAPSE, although attractive, is
not safe from problems. Basically, and beyond any questions regarding the interpreta-
tion of the modalities involved, it turns unrestricted quantification over sets unstable.
It remains then the question of what to do with the knock-down argument if
COMP-P is adopted and COLLAPSE is rejected. The idea is that the Russell plurality
r r fails to form a set. For that reason, in any considerations involving pluralities
and sets, first order quantifiers   x and   x must not have the same interpretation
domain as the plural quantifiers   x x and   x x . The paradox arises when, assuming
COLLAPSE, the Russell plurality r r forms a set. This way we can talk about the Russell
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plurality rr without there being an object — falling under the first order quantifier
— which is the set form by the things that constitute that plurality. Consistency is
restored, allowing us to preserve the expressive resources needed to have legitimate
high order quantification.
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Resumo. Este artigo trata da questão sobre quais as circunstâncias em que uma pluralidade
forma um conjunto. Meu ponto principal é que nem sempre todas as coisas formam conjun-
tos. Um a maneira provocativa de apresentar minha posição é que, como um resultado de
minha abordagem, existem mais pluralidades do que conjuntos. Outra maneira de apresen-
tar a mesma tese afirma que existem maneiras de falar de objetos que nem sempre colapsam
em conjuntos. Meu argumento está relacionado com o poder expressivo de linguagens for-
mais. Assumindo a lógica clássica, mostro que se toda pluralidade forma um conjunto e os
quantificadores são absolutamente gerais, então obtemos uma teoria trivial. Portanto, por
reduction, devemos abandonar uma das premissas. Então, argumento contra o colapso de
pluralidades em conjuntos. O que estou advogando é que a tese do colapso limita importantes
aplicações da lógica plural na teoria de modelos, quando é assumido que os quantificadores
são absolutamente gerais.
Palavras-chave: Pluralidades; generalidade absoluta; conjuntos; hierarquias.
Notes
1 Absolute generality about quantifiers is the view that quantifiers in natural or artificial
languages sometimes range over a domain comprising absolutely everything.
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2 Relativism about quantifiers is the opposing view that quantifiers in natural or artificial
languages never range over a domain comprising absolutely everything.
3 Boolos has developed an ingenious formal device, alternative to Tarski’s, in which interpre-
tations are not objects themselves, but values or second order variables assignments. Boolos’
idea was to use a high order language which allows to talk about certain individuals (whether
or not they form a set) that play the role of a model for the language. These, and not sets, cod-
ify a specification of the individuals over which the quantifiers range. An application of this
idea is to talk about a domain of “all sets”, without committing with such an entity. And like
that, more expressive power can be achieved, and contradictions can be avoided. G. Boolos
(1985).
4 See Rayo 2006. For the classic idea, see Boolos 1984, 1985, and Lewis 1990.
5 Cartwright (1994) claims that “The general principle appears to be that to quantify over
certain objects is to presuppose that these objects constitute a “collection” or a “completed
collection” — some one thing of which those objects are members. I call this the All-in-One
Principle”.
6 Of course, the use of more expressive resources on the metalanguage (predicates and plural
quantification) opens up the discussion about expressive conditions of that language, and
about the resources necessary to provide semantics to it. Rayo (2006) has shown that “in
the presence of absolutely general quantification, proper semantic theorizing is essentially
unstable: it is impossible to provide a suitably general semantics for a given language in a
language of the same logical type.” p.220. Because of that, we are forced to ascend on the
hierarchy of pluralities, in order to accomplish our goal. All that is needed is an unlimited
hierarchy of plural expressions to provide semantics to any of the plural languages we can
face. For an explanation of the hierarchies in the context of theory of types, sets and plurals,
see Linnebo, O. & Rayo, A (2012).
7 Recently McGee (1997) has shown that ZF axioms formulated in second order, plus the ax-
iom of choice with urelements (ZFCU2) allow to characterize the structure of the universe of
pure sets up to isomorphism. This result could be interpreted as establishing the “size” of the
universe of sets. Nonetheless, the result is obtained by assuming unrestricted quantification,
and does not provide a way to decide whether there are seven inaccessible cardinals, less or
more. In any case, I do not need to refer to McGee’s controversial result in order to defend
my position.
8 For an informal proof of the result, see Shapiro 1991, p.82–3.
9 When standard models are used, n-ary predicative variables range over the entire class of
relations on the domain. A standard model of a second order language is a structure similar to
that of first order languages: a domain and an interpretation function assigning appropriate
semantic values to the non-logical expressions. When some domain is specified, it fixes the
range of both kind of variables: first and second order. The set of all subsets of the domain
determines the set of assignments to second order variables.
10 As I showed at the first part of this paper, beyond arithmetical examples, there are exam-
ples in natural language which help to illustrate the same point. In this direction, adopting
COLLAPSE, by limiting P-COMP, leaves us without a sound interpretation of Kaplan’s sen-
tence: “Some critics admire only one another”. But, adopting my view, this sentence can be
formalized using plural expressions.
11 This approach is also followed by James Studd (2015).
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12 The first three properties of the relation guarantee that the process is partially ordered.
Linnebo, O. (2013).
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